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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN PAUL VAROZ, a minor 
appearing by and through 
BENIGNO VAROZ, his guardian 
ad litem, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DONALD D. SEVEY, 
Administrator of the estate of 
RONALD F. SEVEY, deceased, and 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
12956 
This was an action by a minor, by and through his 
guardian ad litem, for the wrongful death of his mother. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted the motion to dismiss of 
defendant Salt Lake County upon the ground that 
1 
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plaintiff failed to comply with the prov1s1ons of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The judgment should be reversed and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-appellant Stephen Paul Varoz is the four 
year old son of Mary Patricia Varoz, deceased, and is 
her sole surviving heir. Stephen was orphaned by his 
mother's death. Benigno Varoz, Stephen's grandfather, 
has been appointed guardian ad litem for the purpose 
of instituting and prosecuting the instant action. 
Mary Patricia Varoz was riding as a passenger 
in a car driven by Ronald F. Sevey, also deceased. The 
vehicle was proceeding in a southerly direction on 
Second West Street in Salt Lake County near the inter-
section of that street with 3900 South Street. There is a 
sharp 90 degree turn in Second West where it intersects 
with 3900 South. The car in which Mary was riding 
failed to negotiate that curve, struck and rolled over 
a guard rail located along the edge of the curve and 
came to rest upside down. 
As a result of this accident, Mary received injuries 
from which she died at the scene. Ronald Sevey, the 
driver, also received fatal injuries in this accident from 
which he died approximately one week later. 
2 
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Minutes after the accident, Deputy Sheriff Bill 
Van W agenen of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's De-
partment was present at the scene. Van W agenen took 
written statements from the two individuals who had 
witnessed the accident and also took measurements at 
the accident scene. Based upon these measurements, 
detailed diagrams of the scene of the accident were 
prepared by a member of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office. In addition, the Identification Officer of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office took photographs of 
the scene. Donald Sawaya, a Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney, was called to the scene of the accident by 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. Sawaya made 
an investigation at the scene of the accident, followed 
up that investigation at Cottonwood Hospital, requested 
that blood samples be taken from both Varoz and Sevey, 
and requested that a postmortem examination be per-
formed upon Mary. (R.49). 
The day after the accident, Deputy Van W agenen 
examined the vehicle to determine whether or not the 
accident had been caused by any mechanical defects. 
(R.50). 
Deputy Van W agenen also prepared an accident 
report, a copy of which report was sent to the Salt Lake 
County Traffic Engineer shortly after the accident. 
That report contained the following statement by the 
deputy: 
Curve sign which is positioned north of t!1e ac-
cident scene appears to be inadequate warnmg of 
3 
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the 90 ° curve ahead due to several accidents at 
this location involving ran off road vehicles. 
Guard rail has not been repaired from previous 
accidents and should have two or more relector-
ized spans with large reflectorized arrow affixed 
on the rail indicatmg road direction. Changed 
rail at present height is more contributory and 
[sic} preventative to injury and damage. (R. 50). 
Within a matter of weeks following this accident, 
Salt Lake County caused additional warning signs 
and devises to be placed at the scene of the accident. 
(R.50). 
On or about May 24, 1971, Robert Goicoechea, an 
attorney on behalf of Stephen's grandfather, made in-
quiry of the Salt Lake County Highway Department 
as to whether Salt Lake County or the State of Utah 
maintained Second West near 3900 South Street. At 
that time an employee of the Salt Lake County High-
way Department informed him that the street was 
maintained by the State of Utah. As a result of this 
conversation, and in reliance thereon, and in good faith 
belief that the street was maintained by the State of 
Utah, on October 18, 1971, Mr. Goicoechea filed a 
notice of claim with the State Road Commission on 
behalf of Stephen. (R.41, 42). 
On December 1, 1971, the State denied the claim 
on the ground that the street was not maintained by 
it but by Salt Lake County. As a result, on December 
7, 1971, a notice of claim was filed with Salt Lake 
County on Stephen's behalf. On January 10, 1972, 
defendant Salt Lake County denied the claim on the 
4 
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ground that it was not timely filed. (R.42). Two months 
after the claim was denied, this action was instituted 
on Stephen's behalf. 
Defendant Salt Lake County moved the lower court 
to dismiss the action upon the ground that Stephen's 
notice of claim had not been filed within the limits pro-
vided in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. This 
motion was heard on May 12, 1972, and taken under 
advisement. It was granted by the Court on May 23, 
1972. (R.5, 6). From that judgment of dismissal plain-
tiff-appellant Stephen Paul Varoz appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The Court erred in holding that plaintiff-appellant's 
claim was barred by the provisiom of Section 63-30-13 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended) . 
It appears from the facts that the death of Mary 
Patricia Varoz was caused by the failure of Salt Lake 
County to adequately warn of the 90 degree curve in 
Second West Street near its intersection of 3900 South 
Street, in Salt Lake County, and in failing to construct 
and maintain guard rails on that curve. There is no 
doubt that under the provisions of the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-1 et seq., Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended) the defense of 
governmental immunity has been waived for a wrongful 
5 
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death resulting from negligent om1ss1ons of the type 
involved in the instant action. 
Section 63-30-8 of that act provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental en-
tities is waived for any injury caused by a de-
fective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road, street * * * or other structure lo-
cated thereon. 
The term "injury" is defined in section 63-30-2 as 
follows: 
( 6) The word "injury" means death, * * * that 
would be actionable if inflicted by a private per-
son or organization. 
In Bramel v. Utah State Road Commission, 24 
Utah 2d 50, 465 P.2d 534 (1970), this court upheld 
the trial court's determination that the Commission was 
negligent in failing to adequately warn of a sharp curve 
in a detour on Interstate Highway 15, which negligence 
resulted in personal injury and property damage. That 
case arose under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
The sole ground upon which the judgment of dis-
missal was entered was that plaintiff-appellant failed 
to comply with the requirements of section 63-30-13. 
That section provides: 
A claim against a political subdivision shall be 
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed with-
in ninety days after the cause of action arises; 
*** 
6 
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While it is true that plaintiff-appellant's notice 
of claim was not filed within ninety days after the acci-
dent, it is clear that plaintiff-appellant substantially 
com plied with the provisions of section 63-30-13; that 
the purpose of that section was fulfilled by the notice 
of claim filed by plaintiff-appellant; that defendant 
Salt Lake County has suffered absolutely no prejudice 
as a consequence of plaintiff-appellant's failure to file 
a notice of claim within the short time permitted by that 
section, and that, under the circumstances, a severe 
injustice would be performed upon the minor plaintiff 
if his claim were deemed barred by the provisions of that 
section. 
The rule in this jurisdiction, established both by 
statute and by cases, is that a statute should be liberally 
construed to effectuate the purpose of the statute and 
to promote justice. Section 68-3-2 Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953 (as amended). Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 
2d 106, 404 P.2d 972 (1965). 
The purpose of statutes requiring that notice of 
claims be given governmental entities was stated by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 
63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924). In holding that a 
plaintiff who filed no claim at all is barred from institut-
ing an action against a town, this court stated: 
In the first supposed case the municipality is at 
least notified sufficiently to investigate the merits 
of the claim, w'hich, evidently, is the main purpose 
of the statute. In the second supposed case, the 
city received no notice of all, and the very pur-
7 
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pose of the statute is defeated** *. 63 Utah 589 
at 594, 228 P.2d 213 at 215 lemphasis added]. 
If, as this court has stated, the purpose of notice 
statutes is to provide the governmental entity with 
sufficient information to make a timely investigation 
of the merits of the claim, then the purpose of the notice 
requirements is served if the governmental entity has 
the information necessary to make an investigation, and 
does in fact make such an investigation, notwithstanding 
the fact that the notice of claim may not have been 
filed within the statutory time limit. 
The injustice that can result from a failure by a 
injured person to strictly comply with a notice require-
ment in just this type of situation was recognized by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in the recent case of Jorstad 
v City of Lewiston, 93Idaho122, 456, P.2d 766 (1969). 
In that case, plaintiff, as guardian ad litem of seven 
minor children, brought an action for the wrongful 
death of her husband arising out of the collision of his 
automobile with a street divider. Plaintiff alleged that 
the intersection where the accident occurred was in the 
process of construction and that the warning devises 
at the construction site were inadequate. From a jury 
verdict in favor of plaintiff, defendant appealed. 
On appeal, defendant argued that plaintiff failed 
to file a timely claim under the city charter, which 
charter required that a written notice of claim be filed 
with the city within thirty days after the injury was 
8 
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~uslained. 1 The decedent's death occurred on January 
:W, 1966, and notice was served on February 17, 1967, 
nearly thirteen months after the accident. Defendant 
urged that a timely filing of the claim was a condition 
precedent to the bringing of the action. 
After reviewing the pros and cons of notice statutes, 
the Supreme Court of Idaho stated: 
It is now well established law in this jurisdic-
tion that the purpose and intent of these notice 
statutes is two-fold: 
(I) to save needless litigation and expense 
by providing an opportunity for amicable ad-
justment of the differences between the parties. 
[Citing cases.); and 
( 2) to provide "such information that the 
authorities may be able to make a full investi-
gation of the cause of the injury and determine 
the city's liability therefore." [Citing cases.] 
In determining whether the purpose of the stat-
ute has been achieved, it must be borne in mind 
that "a substantial compliance is all that is re-
quired in specifying the time, place, character 
and cause of the damage * * * the object of the 
statute must be kept in mind, and it should not be 
1. Section 228 of the Charter of the City of Lewiston provides 
as follows: 
Before the city of Lewiston shall be liable for damages 
for personal injuries of any kind, the person injured or some 
one on his behalf shall by filing notice with the city clerk 
give notice in writing of such injury within thirty days after 
the same has been sustained, stating in such notice, when, 
where and how the injury occurred, and t_he a~parent ex~ent 
thereof, and the failure to so notify the city w1thm the time 
and manner specified herein shall exonerate, excuse and 
exempt the city from liability whatsoever. 
9 
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given any construction that will defeat the ends 
of ;ustice." [Citing cases.] 
We hold that there was substantial compliance 
with the statute in this case and the purposes for 
which the statute was designed were met. The 
notice was filed on February 17, 1967, and the 
complaint was filed on March 31, 1967. The city 
had a full month within which to seek an amicable 
adjustment of the matter. Furthermore, and most 
important, the city had ample actual notice of 
"time, place, character and cause" of plaintiff's 
damage. Police officers employed by appellant 
and its engineers were on the scene within hours 
investigating the same. Where the city had sub-
stantial actual notice of serious injury to the po-
tential plaintiff, it cannot complain of the plain-
tiff's failure to follow the letter of the formal re-
quirements of the notice of statute. This is partic-
ularly so where the parties in interest are minors 
and must rely upon others to give the required no-
tice. [Citing cases.]456 P.2d 766 at 769, 770 
[emphasis added]. 
See also Funk v. Chester, 34 Del.Co. 106 (Pa., 
1946) and Bricker v. Gardner, 55 Daugh.Co.75 (Pa., 
1944). 
In the instant action a Salt Lake County deputy 
sheriff, other employees of the Sheriff's Office and a 
deputy county attorney investigated the accident, and 
the facts and circumstances surrounding it, as soon as 
it occurred. Measurements and diagrams were made 
of the scene, photographs were taken and written state-
ments were received from eyewitnesses. A follow-up 
examination was made of the vehicle and medical tests 
10 
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were performed on the accident victims. The investiga-
tion of this accident may have been routine (R. 19, 20, 
21) , but it was most certainly thorough. Defendant 
Salt Lake County could not be better prepared for this 
litigation had it received a notice of claim at the instant 
the accident occurred. 
The case law in Utah relating to the filing of 
the notice of claim against governmental entites arose 
under sections 10-7-77 and 10-7-78 Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953 (as amended) , and its predecessor sections. 
These sections deal with claims against cities and towns 
for injuries arising out of defective sidewalks, streets 
and other public improvements. While it is true that 
these cases were quite strict in construing the filing 
requirements of those sections, there are good reasons 
why this case law should not be deemed controlling in 
deciding cases arising under the Utah Governmental 
Act. 
Sections 10-7-77 and 10-7-78 contain specific re-
quirements both as to the form and to the contents of 
a notice of claim. As a consequence, this Court has 
felt constrained to strictly construe the requirements 
imposed by that legislative enactment even though harsh 
results sometimes followed. However, in enacting the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act the Utah legislature 
did not incorporate therein the same type of notice 
requirements as those contained in sections 10-7-77 and 
10-7-78. For example, section 63-30-13 provides: 
11 
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A claim against a political subdivision shall be 
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed withm 
ninety days after the cause of action arises; pro-
vided, however, that any claim filed against a cily 
or incorporated town under section 63-30-8 shall 
be governed by the provisions of section 10-7-77, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
It does not, by its language, require that the notice 
be in any particular form, that it contain any particular 
information or even that it be in writing. Had the 
legislature desired that a notice meet any specific require-
ments, it certainly could have included such require-
ments in the statute, as it did in the second clause 
of section 63-30-13. Obviously then, the legislature did 
not intend that the same strict requirements which are 
imposed by sections 10-7-77 and 10-7-78 should be 
incorporated into the Governmental Immunity Act. 
"There, as here, the governmental entity has actual, 
ample notice of the facts and circumstances out of which 
a claim raises, and has suffered no prejudice by the 
failure of the claimant to file a formal notice within 
the short time required, the Governmental Immunity 
Act should not be construed so as to defeat an other-
wise meritorious action. 
Further, sections 10-7-77 and 10-7-78 were deemed 
to create a new cause of action. Thus, in Hurley v. 
'l'own of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924), 
this court, in holding that the plaintiff was barred from 
maintaining the action because of his failure to allege 
th'.lt a claim had been filed, stated: 
12 
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* * * b.y the great weight of authority, as we 
read and mterpret the adjudicated cases, the pre-
~entation. ~fa claim within the time fixed by law 
~s a condition. pr~cedent to the bringing of action 
m cases of this kmd. The right to institute an ac-
tion in. this class of cases is purely statutory. It did 
not exist at common law, and therefore the condi-
tions precedent and fixed by the statute which 
confers the right must be complied with or the 
action fails. Berger v. Salt Lake City, supra. 63 
Utah 589 at 594, 228 P. 213 at 215. 
See also Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 
106 P.2d 1028 (1940). 
However, this court has consistently held that the 
Governmental Immunity Act of 1965 does not create a 
new cause of action but simply waives the defense of 
sovereign immunity in certain circumstances. In hold-
ing that the doctrine of estoppel in pais may be invoked 
against a governmental entity, this court stated in Rice 
v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 
(1969): 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act does 
not create a new cause of action; this act merely 
waives a defense, sovereign immunity in certain 
actions; see Section 63-30-5 through 63-30-10, 
and provides that the liability of the governmental 
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a 
private person. 23 Utah 2d 22 at 27, 456 P.2d 
159 at 163. 
See also Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 
P.2d 367 (1968), and Stephens v. Salt Lake County, 
25 Utah 2d 168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970). 
13 
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Under sections 10-7-77 and 10-7-78 the filing of 
notice of claim with a governmental entity was con-
strued as an essential element of the cause of action 
itself. Under the Governmental Immunity Act, the 
filing requirement is at most a procedural requirement 
which allows the governmental entity to investigate 
the facts and circumstances of the case. As such, the 
provisions of section 63-30-13 should not be construed 
to bar this action by plaintiff-appellant when defendant 
Salt Lake Conuty had ample actual notice of the facts 
and circumstances which gave rise to that claim. As 
the Idaho Supreme Court pointed out in Jorstad v. City 
of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 456 P.2d 766 (1969): 
It must be borne in mind that we are not here 
dealing with an action such as those arising from 
a fall caused by a minor sidewalk defect, which 
incidents cannot often be substantiated outside of 
the claimant's own testimony. Here there was 
substantial external evidence of the circumstances 
of the decedent's accident and all the facts were 
equally available to both appellant and respond-
ent. Their advantages in gathering evidence were 
co-equal and they both labored under disability 
of Morris Kopf's [the decedent] death and con-
sequent failure of testimony as to the cause of the 
accident. If the appellant was unduly prejudice 
by lack of timely notice, it should have shown the 
nature of its prejudice. 456 P.2d 766 at 770. 
II 
The lower court erred in failing to hold that defend-
ant Salt Lake County should be estopped from denying 
the timeliness of plaintiff-appellant's notice of claim. 
14 
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This court has recently held, in Rice v .Grooite 
School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969}, 
that in appropriate circumstances the doctrine of equit-
able estoppel may be invoked to preclude a govern-
mental entity from raising as a defense the statute of 
limitations contained in the Utah Governmental Im-
munity Act. See also Farrell v. County of Placer, 23 
Cal.2d 624, 145 P.2d 570, 153 A.L.R. 323 (1944); 
Benner v. Industrial Accident Commission, 26 Cal.2d 
346, 159 P.2d 24 (1945); Dettamanti v. Lompoc Union 
School District, 143 Cal.App.2d 715, 300 P.2d 78 
( 1956). 
The essential elements necessary for the application 
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel are stated in 28 
Am.J ur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §35 as follows: 
Broadly speaking, the essential elements of an 
equitable estoppel or estoppel in pois, as related 
to the party to be estopped, are: ( 1) conduct 
which amounts to a false representation or con-
cealment of material facts, or, at least, which is 
calculated to convey the impression that the facts 
are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those 
which the party subsequently attempts to assert; 
( 2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that 
such conduct will be acted upon by, or influence, 
the party or other persons; and (3) knowledge, 
actually or constructive, of the real facts. And, 
broadly speaking, as relate~ to the party claim-
ing the estoppel, the essential elements are ( 1) 
lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge 
of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reli-
ance, in good faith, upon the conduct or sta;te-
ments of the party to be es topped; and ( 3) action 
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or inaction based thereon of such character as to 
change the positio~ ~r ~tatus of the party claiming 
t~e estoppel, to his InJury, detriment, or preju-
dice. 
It is evident from the facts of the instant case that 
all of the elements necessary to support an estoppel 
against defendant Salt Lake County are present. 
Plaintiff's attorney made inquiry of the Salt Lake 
County Highway Department concerning the mainten-
ance of the highway where the accident occurred. An 
agent and employee of the County Highway Depart-
ment informed plaintiff's attorney that the highway was 
maintained by the State of Utah. It is obvious from 
the fact that the plaintiff's attorney filed his notice of 
claim with the Utah State Road Commission within 
the time permitted by statute that he relied upon that 
representation. As a result of his good faith belief that 
the State of Utah maintained the highway in question 
and that the information given him was correct, plain-
tiff's notice of claim was not filed within the short time 
permitted by the Governmental Immunity Act. Def end-
ant Salt Lake County now seeks to assert that failure 
to bar plaintiff's claim. 
Defendant Salt Lake County should not now be 
permitted to benefit from the false statements made by 
its agent and employee, in the course of his employment, 
and upon which plaintiff relied to his detriment. 
16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
III 
The notice of claim requirement of the Utah Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act violates the United States 
CoMtitution, amendment XIV, section l, and the Utah 
Constitution, article I, section 2. 
Section I of amendment XIV to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
* * * nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws. 
Article 1, section 2, of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: 
All political power is inherent in the people; 
and all free governments are founded on their 
authority for their equal protection and benefit, 
* * * 
Section 63-30-4 states, in part: 
* * * wherein immunity from suit is waived 
by this act, consent to be sued is granted and 
liability of the entity shall be determined as if the 
entity were a private person. [Emphasis added]. 
The Utah legislature thus declared that in those 
cases where the defense of sovereign immunity is waived 
a governmental entity is to be treated as if it were a 
private person. However, the legislature then went on 
to require that, unlike a private person, a governmental 
entity must receive from an injured party a notice of 
claim within a specified period. The enactment of the 
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notice requirement contained in sections 63-30-12 and 
63-30-13 imposes upon a person injured by a govern-
mental entity a condition, in the form of a special statute 
of limitations, which is not imposed upon a person in-
jured by another private person. 
The imposition of a notice requirement upon a 
person injured by the wrongdoing of a governmental 
entity, which entity is to be treated as any other private 
person, denies such injured person the equal protection 
of the laws guaranteed to him by the Constitutions of 
the United States and of the State of Utah. 
In Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 
617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972), plaintiff was injured in 
an automobile accident and filed a notice of claim with 
the State Highway Department 63 days after the acci-
dent. The Michigan Tort Claims Act required that 
notice be given within 30 days after an accident. The 
lower court entered judgment for the state and an inter-
mediate appeals court affirmed that decision. Plaintiff 
appealed. On appeal two similar cases were consoli-
dated with it. 
After first holding that the 60 day notice provision 
of the Michigan Tort Claims Act, as it applied to 
minors, violated the due process clause of the Michigan 
and United States Constitutions, the Michigan Supreme 
Court, in reversing the decision of the trial court, stated: 
The object of the legislation under considera-
tion is to waive the immunity of governmental 
units and agencies from liability for injuries 
18 
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caused by their negligent conduct, thus putting 
them on equal footing with private tort-f easors. 
Ho_wev~r, the notice provisions of the statute 
arb1tranly split the natural class, i.e., all tort-
f e~sors, into two differently treated subclasses; 
pnvate tort-feasors to whom no notice of claim 
is owed and governmental tort-feasors to whom 
notice is owed. 
This diverse treatment of members of a class 
along the lines of governmental or private tort-
f easors bears no reasonable relationship under 
today's circumstances to the recognized purpose 
of the act. It constitutes an arbitrary and un-
reasonable variance in the treatment of both 
portions of one natural class and is, therefore, 
barred .by the constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection. 
Just as the notice requirement by its operation 
divides the natural class of negligent tort-feasors, 
so too the natural class of victims of negligent 
conduct is also arbitrarily split into two sub-
classes; victims of governmental negligence who 
must meet the requirement and victims of private 
negligence who are subject to no such require-
ment. Contrary to the legislature's intention to 
place victims of negligent conduct on equal foot-
ing, the notice requirement acts as a special 
statute of limitations which arbitrarily bars the 
actions of victims of governmental negligence 
after only 60 days. The victims of private negli-
gence are granted three years in which to .bring 
their action. [Citing statutes.J Such arbitrary 
treatment clearly violates the equal protection 
guarantees of our State and Federal Constitu-
tions. The notice provision is void and of no 
effect. 194 N.W.2d 700 at 702. 
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Like the Michigan act, the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, by its notice requirement, treats victims 
of governmental wrongdoing cliff erently than victims 
of private wrongdoing. The Utah act even discriminates 
among victims of governmental wrongdoing by impos-
ing different periods for filing a notice of claim, depend-
ing upon the status of the governmental entity. Sections 
63-30-12 and 63-30-13. For these reasons, the notice 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act should be declared void as violative of the equal 
protection clauses of the Constitutions of the United 
States and of the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The notice requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act are, for the reasons set forth above, in-
valid and void as violative of the equal protection clauses 
of the Constitutions of the United States and of the 
State of Utah. 
In any event, under the circumstances of this 
case, it must be held that plaintiff-appellant Stephen 
Paul Varoz has substantially complied with the pro-
visions of section 63-30-13 and he should be permitted 
to proceed with this action against defendant Salt 
Lake County. To do otherwise would defeat the purpose 
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of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and work 
a grave injustice upon this minor plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
B. L. Dart, Jr. 
William A. Stegall, Jr. 
JERMAN & DART 
Suite 430 
Ten Broadway Building 
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